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INTRODUCTION 
Cybercrime is a problem that has developed with the increased 
use of computers and the Internet.  At first, viruses plagued only 
the few mainframe computers, but this annoyance1 expanded as 
personal computers became more readily available throughout the 
1980s and 1990s.2  The proliferation of viruses continued as stand-
 
 1 Most viruses were considered an “annoyance” when personal computers were rather 
rare, owned only by those with a true interest in their operation and usefulness, and when 
even professionally written software and operating systems contained many bugs, which 
hampered the reliable use of such systems. See generally SNORRE FAGERLAND ET AL., THE 
NORMAN BOOK ON COMPUTER VIRUSES 35 (2003), available at http://www.lan-aces.com/ 
Norman_Book.pdf. 
 2 Personal computers first became available with the Altair 8800, released in 1975, and 
the Apple 1 developed by Steve Wozniak and Steve Jobs in 1976. See 1973 AD to 1981 
AD The First Personal Computers, (abstracted from CLIVE MAXFIELD & ALVIN BROWN, 
BEBOP BYTES BACK: AN UNCONVENTIONAL GUIDE TO COMPUTERS (1998)), available at 
http://www.maxmon.com/1973ad.htm (providing a basic time line of early personal 
computer development) (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). 
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alone systems became inter-connected, through bulletin board 
systems, and eventually via the Internet, thus increasing the 
potential for damage to computer systems. 
To combat the harm caused by these small yet malicious 
computer programs, state and federal governments attempted to 
prosecute the people causing this damage.  At first, prosecutors 
relied upon the statutes used in prosecuting standard real world 
crimes, but these laws were ineffective because they were not 
written to address the unique aspects of computer crimes.3  New 
statutes focusing strictly on computer crimes were therefore passed 
with language directed at the particular activities involved with 
developing computer technology.4  However, even these new 
statutes have been unable to eliminate the damage caused by 
malicious programs.5 
This Note examines why current computer crime laws are 
ineffective, and will continue to be ineffective, in preventing the 
damage caused by virus and worm computer programs unless 
significant changes are made.  This Note then presents an 
alternative approach to fighting cybercrime that would prohibit the 
writing of virus and worm programs.6  Part I outlines the issues 
involving computer systems, the Internet and malicious software 
and introduces the concept of cybercrime.  Part I.A describes 
 
 3 See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1605–07 (2003) [hereinafter 
Cybercrime’s Scope]; see also Aaron Busstein, A Survey of Cybercrime in the United 
States, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 315 (2003) (describing the general approach law 
enforcement took when first confronted with cybercrimes). 
 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1984); see generally ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS (West Publishers 2006) [hereinafter COMPUTER CRIME LAW]. 
 5 Many believe the amount of damage caused by computer viruses is greatly inflated 
by those reporting it.  However, it is also believed that the number of systems affected is 
greatly underreported to avoid embarrassment and loss of client or consumer confidence. 
See Marc D. Goodman & Susan W. Brenner, The Emerging Consensus on Criminal 
Conduct in Cyberspace, 10 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 139, 155–57 (2002) (describing 
some of the difficulties in quantifying the number of cybercrimes committed and the 
amount of damage sustained). 
 6 The approach is not new; it was previously suggested by some computer 
professionals, but was not seen at the time as a viable or legal alternative to preventing 
the damage caused by malware. See Kim Zetter, Freeze! Drop That Download! The 
Words Are the Bomb, PCWORLD, Nov. 16, 2000, available at http://www.pcworld.com/ 
news/article/0,aid,34406,pg,2,00.asp. 
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malware and explains the technical details of how viruses and 
worms work.  Part I.B explains how viruses and worms are 
released to infect other systems.  Part II examines the threat posed 
by viruses and worms to computer users and society.  Part III 
presents how cybercrime laws currently seek to curb the 
proliferation of virus code and protect the businesses and 
individuals potentially harmed by virus outbreaks.  Part III.A 
outlines the general approach taken to combat cybercrime.  Part 
III.B presents the current approaches taken by the federal and state 
cybercrime laws including the Federal Computer Frauds and 
Abuse Act of 2002.  Part IV examines the possible results of 
prohibiting the writing of virus and worm programs.  Part IV.A 
considers the problems and shortcomings of the current laws.  Part 
IV.B discusses how a new law could address the problems and 
shortcomings of the current laws.  Parts IV.C and D considers the 
issues that outlawing the actual writing of computer virus code 
might raise with the computer-using community, and whether the 
losses are balanced by the gains.  This Note concludes by arguing 
that virus writing itself can and should be made illegal. 
I. BACKGROUND OF CYBERCRIME AND VIRUSES 
Cybercrime encompasses all criminal acts that use a computer.7  
This category of offenses include both acts where the computer is a 
key element of the offense,8 and where the computer helps 
facilitate a crime that would be more difficult or impossible 
without it.9  Cybercrime does not include ordinary crimes that use 
a computer to record or otherwise do something that could be 
accomplished by ordinary means, such as an accountant’s journal 
 
 7 See generally COMPUTER CRIME LAW, supra note 4, at v–vi. 
 8 Id. at 1 (presenting the division between computer misuse crimes and traditional 
crimes committed using computers).  The dissemination of a computer virus or computer 
hacking is a computer misuse crime because a computer system is a necessity to 
effectuate the criminal act.  This differs from the dissemination of child pornography or 
fraud, neither of which require a computer but instead utilize them to facilitate the 
execution of the crime. 
 9 Id. Both of these activities would fall under the heading of substantive computer 
crime law because the methods of perpetrating the crime involve computer technologies, 
which must be addressed in a statute. 
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to record illegal profits, pencil and paper to draw a diagram for a 
robbery, or snail mail10 for communication between accomplices. 
The dissemination of viruses and worms is a computer misuse 
crime, because it could not exist without computers.11  This crime 
involves creating and executing computer code that can transfer 
copies of this computer code to other users’ computer systems.12  
This unwanted transfer of computer code typically results in some 
form of harm to the recipient’s computer system.13  The unwanted 
transfer of code is only one facet of computer crimes, which 
federal and state laws attempt to deal with.14 
Even with state and federal computer crime laws in place,15 
there are very few prosecutions for the damage done by viruses 
and worms released into the wild.16  This is because it is difficult to 
 
 10 “Snail mail” is defined as physical letters delivered by the U.S. Post Office, or some 
other delivery system, as opposed to some form of electronic mail. See Snail Mail, THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000), available at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/snail%20mail (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). 
 11 Currently, the closest physical world analogy to a computer virus is a robot 
programmed to produce copies of itself which then move to new locations and replicate 
only to have the replicates repeat the process. See PETER SZOR, THE ART OF COMPUTER 
VIRUS RESEARCH AND DEFENSE 5–7 (Addison-Wesley 2005) (describing John Von 
Neumann’s theory of self-reproducing automata, the ‘Universal Machine,’ and self-
replicating machines including nano-bots). 
 12 See infra Part I.A. 
 13 This harm could be the loss of application programs or data, as well as the loss of 
confidence in the safety and security of the computer system. 
 14 Computer crimes span the range of online stalking and extortion to online fraud 
schemes, accessing child pornography, and “hacking” into other users’ computer systems 
for fun and profit. See Goodman & Brenner, supra note 5, at 144–49. 
 15 The federal statute that most computer crimes are prosecuted under is the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act.  The first version of this statute was passed in 1984. 18 U.S.C. § 
1030. 
 16 See Ronald B. Standler, Examples of Malicious Computer Programs (2002), 
available at http://www.rbs2.com/cviru s.htm (identifying five prosecutions and 
convictions made against virus writers).  Of the few perpetrators who have been caught, 
most have pleaded guilty to the charges.  This resulted in very few trial and appellate 
opinions clarifying the state and federal cybercrime laws.  Various experts believe these 
prosecutions were only possible because the perpetrators made the mistake of remaining 
in jurisdictions where they could be apprehended. See also Kelly Cesare, Prosecuting 
Computer Virus Authors: The Need for an Adequate and Immediate International 
Solution, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 135, 152–53 (2001) (discussing how David Lee Smith 
was only successfully apprehended for the release of the ‘Melissa’ virus in 1999 because 
he wrote the virus in the United States and remained in the country after its release). 
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identify and track down perpetrators.17  The anonymity of 
cyberspace allows a perpetrator to conceal his identity, and cover 
his electronic tracks in ways that make it much more difficult for 
law enforcement to uncover information as compared to real space 
crimes.  Additionally, it is difficult to apply laws to prosecute 
cybersuspects without a proper understanding and recognition of 
what has actually resulted from the suspect’s acts.18  The 
enforcement officer must recognize that a theft can occur without 
the original article missing, a trespass can occur without the person 
being on the same premises as the computer system, and a 
computer or its data can be rendered inoperable without being 
physically vandalized.19 
A. Definition of Viruses and Technical Descriptions 
The following section will provide a detailed description of 
viruses and worms to help in understanding their nature and 
identifying them in the digital world.  An understanding of the 
technical aspects of a virus code is important so that one may 
determine what type of programming should be outlawed.  It is 
also important to create awareness that some forms of 
programming and dissemination should not be completely 
protected speech.20 
 
 17 See Susan Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of Law 
Enforcement, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 25–32 (2004) (identifying the 
different characteristics of cybercrime which make enforcement much more difficult than 
“real space” crimes).  These differences include lack of any proximity to the location of 
the computer crime, the scale of the crime committed by a single individual, the speed at 
which the crime can be carried out, and the lack of physical constraints to limit the crime. 
See Goodman & Brenner, supra note 5, at 142 (describing some of the difficulties in 
fighting cybercrime). See also Cesare, supra note 16, at 151–53 (discussing the problems 
of enforcing cybercrime laws). 
 18 See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care about Computer Crime, 10 
HARV. J.L. & TECH 465, 486 (1997).  A person cannot be charged with damaging a 
computer if the malware did not cause recognizable damage.  Nor can someone be 
charged with theft if there was nothing in the code to facilitate the taking of information 
or data from an infected system. 
 19 Id. at 482. 
 20 See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 
1098–103 (2005) (discussing aspects of free speech protection that allow the furtherance 
of crimes and how different types of crime are interconnected under a rubric of free 
speech). 
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The term malware is short for malicious software.21  It 
encompasses a wide range of program types including viruses, 
worms, logic bombs, Trojan horses, keyloggers, zombie programs, 
and backdoors.22  Each of these programs has a different structure 
and overall purpose, but there can be overlap.23  The term malware 
is now also used in reference to cookies and other forms of 
spyware when it operates without the user’s knowledge or against 
his wishes.24 
Viruses and worms damage or destroy programs and data files 
located on infected computers.  The use of keyloggers25 allow the 
misappropriation of secret information to be used for financial or 
other gain later by the miscreant. Other types of malicious software 
such as backdoors, 26 Trojan horses,27 and zombie programs are 
capable of allowing access into a computer system and its sensitive 
and confidential information. This type of software provides an 
opportunity to damage or hijack the machine while being able to 
eliminate any evidence of the crime.  Even though there are other 
categories of malware that can cause damage to computer systems, 
they do not have the same potential to cause the widespread 
damage that viruses or worms do. Thus, only viruses and worms 
are directly addressed in the remainder of this Note.28 
 
 21 SZOR, supra note 11, at 28. 
 22 See id. at 28–36 (defining each of the different forms of malicious software). 
 23 See id. (introducing the terminology used in describing the various computer viruses 
and worms). 
 24 See Definitions of Malware on the Web, http://www.google.com/search?q= 
define:malware (providing numerous web definitions) (last visited Nov. 5, 2007). 
 25 SZOR, supra note 11, at 36.  A keylogger is a program that records each key as the 
computer user types and then relays the information to the perpetrator. Id.  The criminal’s 
hope is that the keylogger is able to obtain information such as a credit card or bank 
account numbers that he can then exploit later. 
 26 Id. at 331 (stating back doors listen for a connection from the attacker and then allow 
access to the system).  Back Orifice was the most familiar form of this type of malware. 
Id. 
 27 Id. at 31–32. Trojan Horse programs masquerade as legitimate versions of 
commercial software, but they contain secret code allowing a cyber-criminal access to the 
computer system through a back door. 
 28 This does not imply that these programs do not pose a serious risk to computer use, 
but only that they do not have the characteristics pertinent to this discussion. See Yury 
Mashevsky, Malware Evolution 2005, Feb. 8, 2006, available at 
http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?pubid=178949694 (showing that Trojans now make 
up the largest portion of malicious software being encountered). 
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1. Viruses 
Similar to viruses that may infect a living organism, computer 
viruses can self-replicate.29  A virus makes copies of itself in order 
to spread to new systems against the user’s wishes and without his 
knowledge.30  The virus program accomplishes this by writing a 
set of machine instructions,31 which are attached to another 
executable file32 in some manner when the program in which it is 
embedded is executed by the computer’s central processing unit 
(CPU).33  Viruses must be a part of a program, which the computer 
identifies as a set of instructions to be executed.34  When the newly 
infected program is run, the process repeats itself.35 
Virus code can be added to an existing executable file in a 
variety of ways.36  A plain text file or image file does not contain 
any executable instructions.37  Since the CPU does not expect any 
 
 29 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 18.  Dr. Frederick Cohen, who first coined the term 
“virus,” defined it as “a program that is able to infect other programs by modifying them 
to include a possibly evolved copy of itself.” Id. 
 30 Id. at 20 (“Computer viruses are self-automated programs that, against the user’s 
wishes, make copies of themselves to spread themselves to new targets.”). 
 31 Machine instructions are a set of binary digits of a predetermined length which the 
computer recognizes as a particular operation to be preformed followed by the address or 
value to be operated on.  This is referred to as the opcode. See ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, 
STRUCTURED COMPUTER ORGANIZATION 251–54 (4th ed.1999); see also SZOR, supra note 
11, at 53–54 (explaining the dependency of virus code on the particular Central 
Processing Unit and its opcodes). 
 32 An executable file is one that the computer interprets as instructions to perform 
specific operations as defined within the machine’s hardware. See M. MORRIS MANO, 
COMPUTER SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 251–254 (2d ed. 1982). 
 33 Technical details about the design and operation of a computer’s central processing 
unit (CPU) should be looked up in textbooks on computer architecture and assembly 
language. See generally id.; DAVID A. PATTERSON AND JOHN L. HENNESSEY, COMPUTER 
ORGANIZATION AND DESIGN: THE HARDWARE/SOFTWARE INTERFACE (3d ed. 2004); 
TANENBAUM, supra note 31, at 39–56; RICHARD C. DETMER, INTRODUCTION TO 80X86 
ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE AND COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE (Jones & Bartlett 2001). 
 34 See Carolyn P. Meinel, Introduction to Computer Viruses Part I, GUIDE TO (MOSTLY) 
HARMLESS HACKING, July 19, 1998, available at http://www.happyhacker.org/ 
gtmhh/vol3no71.shtml. 
 35 See Viruslist.com, http://www.viruslist.com/en/virusesdescribed?chapter=152540474 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2007). 
 36 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 129–57 (describing the ways virus code can be 
introduced to a program or system). 
 37 This does not include “macros” which were added to word processing programs and 
other application programs to automate certain tasks.  Virus writers found this 
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executable code in such a file, it does not look for opcodes when 
opening one.38 The application program used to open the file 
interprets any formatting, instructions, or macros.  Implementation 
of macros, however, is another method of embedding virus code 
for execution by the application software.39 
The most blatant way to infect the program is to erase the 
entire executable program and insert the virus code in its place.40  
When this is done, the original file can no longer perform its 
original function.  In fact, running the program will only retrigger 
the virus code.41  This effect may be considered a compromise of 
the system’s integrity.42  This type of virus infection, however, is 
fairly easy to detect.  The program file changes in size from what it 
was originally, and the program does not produce any of the 
expected results when attempts are made to run it.43  These aspects 
of the virus infection make it rather easy to detect and quarantine 
the malicious code, thus preventing its spread or propagation.44  
This keeps down the overall amount of damage caused by this 
virus type. 
One method to avoid the shortcomings of a virus code that 
overwrites its target program is to attach the virus code to the 
beginning or end of the program’s code.45  This method still has 
the problem of noticeably changing the file’s size, however, the 
program’s original code continues to function, thus masking the 
fact it has been infected by the virus.46  This allows the attached 
virus code to be executed many more times because there is no 
 
functionality useful for writing malicious code that could operate on many computers and 
damage documents and other files when opened. See id. at 66–69 (explaining how virus 
code is dependent on the programming environment). 
 38 See supra note 31 (introducing the concept of opcodes). 
 39 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 66–69 (describing how macro viruses are created and 
spread). 
 40 Id. at 130–31 (describing overwriting viruses). 
 41 Id. at 130. 
 42 See infra Part III.B.4. 
 43 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 130–131 (commenting on the shortcomings of this type 
of virus). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 132–35 (describing appending and prepending viruses). 
 46 Id. 
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immediate evidence of a problem.47  The original program 
continues to function as the user desires, although both the 
program and system’s integrity could again be considered 
compromised.48  When a user realizes that his system is infected, 
he will attempt to remove the virus code from the system.  This 
effort results in costs that could be considered consequential 
damages.49 
Another means of infecting a program without altering its size 
is by placing the virus code within one or more cavities50 within 
the host.51  This avoids simple detection methods revealing the 
presence of the virus code.52  It also allows the original program to 
continue functioning. 
Virus code can also be placed in a disk’s boot sector.53  When 
the virus code is located in a boot sector, it takes direct control of 
the system away from the owner or user and tricks the CPU into 
loading the virus writer’s code on start-up.54  Inserting such an 
instruction may compromise the integrity of the computer system, 
because it directly alters the way the system functions.55  This is 
subtly different from an executable virus because of the level at 
 
 47 This considers only the execution of the virus code itself, and not any payload, which 
may cause noticeable damage outside the infected program. See Meinel, supra note 34. 
 48 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 66–69 (describing how macro viruses are created and 
spread). 
 49 Contract law defines consequential damages as those foreseeable to the parties at the 
time the contract was formed. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS 547–48 (4th ed. 1998).  Losses that do not “flow directly and immediately 
from an injurious act, but that result indirectly from the act” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
416 (8th ed. 2004). 
 50 Cavities consist of sections of code containing zeroes, spaces, holes, or other null 
values. See SZOR, supra note 11, at 136–39. 
 51 See id. (describing cavity and fractionated cavity viruses). 
 52 More advanced anti-virus software can detect these viruses through a checksum 
analysis. See Vasselin Bontchev, Possible Virus Attacks Against Integrity Programs and 
How to Prevent Them, PROC. 2ND INT’L VIRUS BULL. CONF. (1992), available at 
http://www.people.frisk-software.com/~bontchev/papers/attacks.html. 
 53 The boot sector is the location on a hard drive or floppy disk where the computer 
looks for instructions on loading the operating system or other files located on the disk.  
By placing the correct type of instruction in a boot sector, the computer can be instructed 
to load a virus into memory before an operating system or anti-virus program is loaded. 
See SZOR, supra note 11, at 122–29. 
 54 See id. at 125 (describing how a Master Boot Record can become infected). 
 55 See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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which the boot sector virus works.56  It supersedes all other 
software priorities by taking control of the computer system before 
any other software is loaded.  An executable virus operates on top 
of the operating system and any other memory resident programs.57 
Each of these computer virus infections needs a method of 
spreading to additional systems just as a real microbe needs a 
vector to spread to new hosts.58  Viruses, unlike worms, do not 
self-propagate.  In order to spread, a human agent must distribute 
the virus to new systems.59  A virus typically spreads when an 
infected program is shared with others.  Initially, this was 
accomplished by physically passing along a program on a portable 
media,60 which had a boot sector virus embedded in it, or an 
infected file saved on it.  With the development of bulletin board 
systems accessed through modem and telephone lines, this 
physical transfer was no longer the only means of transferring 
files.  Software could be directly uploaded and downloaded 
between individual computers electronically.  The Internet further 
increased the speed and volume of these electronic transfers using 
e-mail, which can send a file to multiple recipients almost 
instantaneously.61 
 
 56 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 122–29 (describing boot viruses generally). 
 57 In fact, executable virus code relies on an operating system being loaded in order to 
function as designed, and is typically operating system specific. See id. at 55 (explaining 
operating system dependency of virus programs). 
 58 See Vector (biological), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vector_%28 
biology%29 (last visited Dec. 19, 2007); see also Virus, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virus (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). 
 59 One example is the sneaker-net, referring to the physical walking of an infected disk 
over to another person. See Sarah Gordon, Technologically Enabled Crime: Shifting 
Paradigms for the Year 2000, 14 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 5, 393 (1995) available at 
http://vx.netlux.org/lib/pdf/Technologically%20Enabled%20Crime%3A%20Shifting%20
Paradigms%20for%20the%20Year%202000.pdf. 
 60 Portable media includes floppy disks, compact discs (CDs), ZIP disks, flash cards, or 
any other magnetic or optical storage device. 
 61 E-mail attachments do not have a boot sector, so this vector cannot transmit boot 
sector viruses. 
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2. Worms 
Worms differ from viruses in two fundamental ways.62  First, 
they do not need to infect other programs in order to spread.63  
Second, they can propagate without a human agent.64  They travel 
between computer systems across network connections by 
exploiting holes or flaws in the programming.65  Like viruses, 
however, they may create modified copies of themselves.  Worms 
are considered a subclass of virus.66 
In order to function, a worm must have two essential parts: a 
target locator component and an infection component.67  The target 
locator examines files on an infected system in order to find 
available systems to which it could send itself.68  The basic means 
of accomplishing this is by locating the e-mail address book on the 
infected system.69  Alternatively, a worm program can be designed 
to search for e-mail addresses on network servers70 or by using 
Internet search engines.71  This method is similar to the one used 
by spammers.72 
Once a worm locates these target e-mail addresses, it must 
exploit some weakness or bug in the programs that support the 
 
 62 Eugene H. Spafford, Computer Viruses as Artificial Life, ARTIFICIAL LIFE, VOL. 1, 
NUM. 3, § 2.1 (1994), available at http://www.scs.carleton.ca/~soma/biosec/readings/ 
spafford-viruses.pdf. 
 63 See Fred Cohen, Computer Viruses - Theory and Experiments, COMPUTERS & 
SECURITY, VOL. 6, § 2 (1984), available at http://vx.netlux.org/lib/pdf/Computer%20 
Viruses%20-%20Theory%20and%20Experiments.pdf. 
 64 See Eugene H. Spafford, The Internet Worm Incident, TECH. REPORT CSD-TR-933, 
Department of Computer Science, Perdue University (1988), available at 
http://homes.cerias.purdue.edu/~spaf/tech-reps/933.pdf (discussing the technical details 
of the worm released by Robert T. Morris in 1988). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 314–15 (describing the structure of computer worms 
compared to viruses). 
 67 See id. at 315–16 (describing the components of a worm program). 
 68 See id. at 319 (describing harvesting of e-mail information from address books). 
 69 Id. 
 70 See id. at 320–21 (describing ways to obtain e-mail addresses from network servers). 
 71 See id. at 321–22 (describing ways to obtain e-mail addresses with Internet search 
engines). 
 72 See id. at 323–24 (describing how the methods of obtaining e-mail addresses can be 
combined in a worm). 
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computer network.73  Worms use exploits74 to transfer its code 
directly over the network, thereby avoiding the need to infect some 
carrier program.75  The simplest form of weakness used by a worm 
to infect a system is social engineering using an enticing e-mail 
header or file name to trick a receiving party into opening the letter 
or attachment.76  Upon opening the attachment, the worm program 
is executed on that computer.77  This is also one of the hardest 
exploits to counter, because it involves protecting the system user 
from himself.78  No software package can prevent a user from 
purposely granting access to malicious code. 
In each of these instances, the issue of damage caused by a 
worm is questionable.  Without executing some form of malicious 
code, the worm simply takes up residency on the system, and in 
some cases this is only temporary.79  However, there is no question 
that a worm compromises a computer system’s integrity.  The 
worm code immediately causes the computer to behave in a 
manner that is against the owner’s wishes and without his 
 
 73 Robert Morris’s worm program capitalized on two weaknesses and one bug in the 
programs used to allow the network to function.  The bug was located in the fingerd 
program used to gain information on network users.  The program code allowed buffer 
overruns from overly long input strings.  The first weakness was a debugger function 
available in the sendmail program, which was typically left accessible by network 
administrators as a matter of convenience.  The second weakness involved trusted hosts.  
This feature allowed someone on a system marked as trusted to access other systems 
without use of a password.  The third method of gaining access to systems involved a 
brute force method of guessing passwords on secured systems. See Eugene H. Spafford, 
The Internet Worm Program: An Analysis, TECH. REPORT CSD-TR-823 § 3, Department 
of Computer Sciences, Purdue University (1988) [hereinafter The Internet Worm 
Program] (describing in computer science terms the technical details of each of the flaws 
exploited by the worm). 
 74 An exploit is a flaw in the system programming or configuration that allows the 
worm code to access another computer, which its user would otherwise consider safe and 
secure. See FFIEC Information Technology Examination Handbook Glossary, 
http://www.ffiec.gov/ffiecinfobase/html_pages/gl_01a.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2007). 
 75 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 341–44 (discussing three modes of attack on targeted 
systems). 
 76 See id. at 333–34 (discussing some tricks used by worms to get executed). 
 77 Some might argue that this violates one of the definitions of a worm, because it 
requires human intervention in order to propagate similar to a standard virus. 
 78 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 333–34 (discussing some tricks used by worms to get 
executed). 
 79 See id. at 29–30 (defining rabbits as a worm variant which terminates its code on one 
system after infecting another). 
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knowledge.  This is true even when the user is the one to activate 
the worm by opening an attachment because the result is 
unexpected and unwanted. 
3. Payloads 
A virus or worm may or may not have a payload.80  The 
payload is additional code beyond what is needed for the virus to 
function.  If there is a payload, it can be nondestructive,81 
somewhat destructive,82 or highly destructive.83  A nondestructive 
payload is typically some form of amusement including graphics 
or music.84  Somewhat destructive payloads may alter files or 
affect system performance, but don’t have any serious lasting 
effect.85  The most serious payloads are highly destructive, and are 
of the most concern.  These viruses may overwrite files or erase 
them from the disk altogether.86  The most malicious payload does 
not do readily recognizable damage, but instead makes small 
modifications continuously over time until all the files are 
corrupted in some manner.87  This kind of code causes more 
damage because of the subtle way it causes damage.  It is difficult 
to detect early on, and when it is finally noticed, it has already 
permeated the entire system.  The final form of damage is the 
attack of hardware.88  The code actually alters programmable chips 
on hardware devices or containing the BIOS preventing the actual 
hardware or computer from functioning.  All of the highly 
 
 80 See id. at 296 (stating that the majority of viruses do not carry any form of code 
beyond that required to replicate, or at most a name or message to be found by anti-virus 
researchers). 
 81 See id. at 297 (describing non-destructive virus and worm payloads). 
 82 See id. at 300 (describing somewhat destructive virus and worm payloads). 
 83 See id. at 301–06 (describing highly destructive virus and worm payloads). 
 84 See id. at 298 (mentioning W95/Marburg as a virus of this type.  Marburg randomly 
placed 256 icons on the desktop). 
 85 See id. at 301 (mentioning the WM/Wazzu.A virus as a somewhat destructive virus.  
Wazzu randomly scrambled three words and placed “wazzu” into documents.). 
 86 See id. (mentioning the Michelangelo virus as one of the well known viruses in this 
category). 
 87 See id. at 302–03 (discussing data diddlers as a particularly malicious form of data 
corruption). 
 88 See id. at 305–06 (discussing how viruses could alter a machine’s Flash BIOS 
thereby preventing boot up). 
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destructive payload attacks cause damage to the files on a user’s 
system.  These are exactly the results the criminal statutes attempt 
to address.89 
B. How Malware is Released 
In order to perpetrate a crime through a virus or worm, a 
person must first create a malicious program.  When a programmer 
attempts to create a computer virus or worm,90 he has a very 
definite purpose in mind.  A virus is unlike any other computer 
code.  It is specifically designed to replicate itself onto uninfected 
machines.91  The more complex the computer programming used 
to accomplish this by making the virus undetectable and resistant 
to treatment by anti-virus software,92 the more obvious the 
programmer’s intention to create a malicious form of program.93  
A worm differs in the manner in which it spreads, but there must 
be a similar intent to produce code with the sole purpose of 
obtaining unauthorized access to a computer system and then 
replicating and propagating itself. 
 
 89 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) (2002) (“intentionally causes damage . . .”); § 
1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) (“recklessly causes damage . . .”); § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (“causes 
damage . . .”). 
 90 Throughout this Note, the term virus will generally include worms. See supra note 
66 and accompanying text. 
 91 See supra Part I.A. 
 92 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 220–47 (discussing methods of protecting virus code 
from anti-virus software by “armoring” them). 
 93 It has been debated whether a virus is inherently malicious, and most researchers 
believe the malicious aspects of viruses are accidental rather than purposeful. See, e.g., 
Meinel, supra note 34.  A virus is defined by its ability to self-replicate and not by the 
damage it might do.  Some computer scientists feel that mass media corrupted the 
definition of viruses to include a malicious nature.  Some researchers have stated that 
very few viruses contain any malicious code.  The resulting damage is usually caused by 
programming flaws, by the overtaxing of computer resources during propagation, and by 
the lack of control over the program’s behavior once it has been released into the wild. 
See, e.g., Vesselin Bontchev, Are “Good” Computer Viruses Still a Bad Idea?, PROC. 
EICAR’94 CONF., 25–47, available at http://www.people.frisk-software.com/~bontchev/ 
papers/goodvir.html [hereinafter Are “Good” Computer Viruses Still a Bad Idea]. 
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The second step is the virus or worm’s release “into the 
wild,”94 in order to cause harm.  The release of a worm or virus can 
be accomplished in a number of different ways.  The most obvious 
way to purposely cause a virus outbreak or computer infection is to 
activate the code on a system connected to the public through the 
Internet or used for downloading files.  It could also be 
disseminated on a form of portable media to unsuspecting users.  
In both cases the person initiating the virus outbreak is doing so 
purposefully and with the hope and expectation that the virus will 
spread.  A less direct method of causing an outbreak involves the 
virus writer uploading his executable code to a website or bulletin 
board.95  This places the functioning virus program in the hands of 
some third party who may then initiate the outbreak by the same 
means available to the writer himself.  The virus writer in this 
scenario does not know if the virus will be released by the other 
person, but expects that at least one person who accesses the 
program will in fact execute it.  A third even more attenuated 
method of disseminating virus code involves providing the public, 
through a website or a bulletin board, with just the uncompiled 
source code as a text file.96  This is similar to the previous 
scenario, but requires the person who acquires the code to go 
through an extra step of compiling the program into an executable 
file before releasing it.  This method counts on the person having 
 
 94 IBM researcher Dave Chess coined the phrase “into the wild.”  It covers virus code, 
which can function on commercial systems in general use by the public. See SZOR, supra 
note 11, at 26. 
 95 See Sarah Gordon, Technologically Enabled Crime: Shifting Paradigms for the Year 
2000, COMPUTERS AND SECURITY § 3.1 (1995), available at 
http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapers/ Gordon/Crime.html (describing the 
use of bulletin boards, newsgroups, and websites for the dissemination of virus code). 
 96 Text versions of virus source code are available on the same sites providing the 
executable code as well as in books on the topic.  The available material can be either 
technical computer science treaties on how to write the components necessary for a virus, 
or underground publications containing the code for various existing viruses. See 
FREDRICK B. COHEN, A SHORT COURSE ON COMPUTER VIRUSES (ACS Publ’ns 1990); 
FREDRICK  B. COHEN, IT’S ALIVE! (John Wiley & Sons 1994); JOHN R. KOZA, GENETIC 
PROGRAMMING: ON THE PROGRAMMING OF COMPUTERS BY MEANS OF NATURAL 
SELECTION, (MIT Press 1992); MARK LUDWIG, THE LITTLE BLACK BOOK OF COMPUTER 
VIRUSES (Am. Eagle Publ’ns 1991); MARK LUDWIG, THE GIANT BLACK BOOK OF 
COMPUTER VIRUSES (Am. Eagle Publ’ns 1995); MARK LUDWIG, THE GIANT BLACK BOOK 
OF COMPUTER VIRUSES (Am. Eagle Publ’ns 2d ed.1998); MARK LUDWIG, THE LITTLE 
BLACK BOOK OF E-MAIL VIRUSES: A TECHNICAL GUIDE (Am. Eagle Publ’ns 2002). 
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the software necessary to compile the source code into executable 
code.  Finally, the virus might also escape accidentally from a 
writer’s system if he does not keep it isolated from networks or 
carrier programs.97 
In considering the intent and culpability of the virus writer, the 
first and last scenarios are cases where the virus has been released 
into the wild, but only in the first case could it be done 
purposefully.  In the second and third scenarios, the virus could be 
considered purposefully distributed by the writer, but in neither 
case has the writer released it.  The second case involves a 
functional form of the virus code which could be released without 
any further effort or expertise required by a third party.  The third 
case involves a minimum level of effort by any third party that 
acquires the source code to put it into a functional form by 
compiling it.98  There is a question of responsibility if a third party 
causes damage through the release of the virus code, particularly if 
the code is already in a functioning form.99  The editing and 
compiling of source code requires an intervening human actor to 
put the code into a form, which is capable of causing damage.100  
Additionally, the writer may not know for certain whether the 
program will actually function the way it was meant to once it is 
installed on a system for which it was not specifically written.101 
However, the question of whether the program will work as 
envisioned by its creator is separate from his intentions in writing 
and releasing the code.102 
 
 97 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 612 (discussing the importance of not introducing 
viruses to non-isolated systems). 
 98 Some authors and scholars mistakenly believe that the computer program text or 
“source code” can directly infect another system by self-executing or through an 
interpreter program.  This is not possible.  Only executable code can be automatically 
loaded into a computer’s random access memory and interpreted as instructions by the 
central processing unit. 
 99 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 13.1–2 (4th ed. 2003) 
(discussing the requirements for accessories and accomplices of a crime). 
 100 See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 536–37 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing causation and 
intervening human actions). 
 101 Virus code which functions within a particular system environment, but not out on 
commercial systems, is termed a “zoo” virus. See SZOR, supra note 11, at 26. 
 102 Many virus authors claim they did not know that the virus or worm program would 
behave the way it did, but this does not change their intent. See Standler, supra note 16 
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II. THE THREAT POSED BY VIRUSES AND WORMS 
Society has identified malicious software including viruses and 
worms as one of the threats to computer systems.  The outbreak 
and infection of computer systems by viruses and worms causes 
hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars in damage for each 
major occurrence.103  It also has a social cost that is not easily 
measured—the computer and Internet-using public’s lost faith in 
the safety and security of the online world.  This fear and aversion 
is a psychological cost, which reduces the use of the Internet for its 
beneficial and commercial purposes. 
III. CURRENT LEGAL EFFORTS TO FIGHT CYBERCRIME 
A. Background of the Federal and State Cybercrime Statutes 
The federal and state governments determined malicious 
software should be dealt with through criminal statutes.  The 
statutes first appearing in the early 1980’s approached the threats 
posed by malicious software and the behaviors of the persons 
responsible for these threats in a specific way.104  The federal 
statute and most state statutes focused on the act of accessing a 
computer without authorization and thereby either causing damage 
or obtaining some form of protected information.  This is because 
the earliest laws focused on the efforts of hackers to gain access to 
important governmental or private computer systems.105  These 
initial statutes were modified over time to address the proliferation 
of viruses and worms, but the focus remained on the malicious 
program gaining unauthorized access to the computer system.  
While gaining access is the direct and specific act that can be 
 
(explaining how the comments in the original source code of the Morris Worm indicated 
the author’s actual intent despite his claims to the contrary). 
 103 See Standler, supra note 16 (listing the recent virus outbreaks and the estimated 
economic harm caused by each outbreak). 
 104 The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act focuses on the unauthorized access of computer 
systems and the damage resulting from such access. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2002) 
(specifying unauthorized access of a computer system). 
 105 See Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the 
Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 177, 199–201 (2000). 
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criminalized, there are other key actions which must first be taken 
by a person attempting to perpetrate a computer crime through the 
use of a virus or worm.  These actions include creating the 
computer code and releasing it.  Associated with these acts are 
certain mental states or mens rea, which is addressed later in this 
Note. 
B.  The Current Laws Directed at Cybercrime 
1. Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
The federal government first enacted the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CFAA”) in 1984.106  The CFAA has been modified 
many times since it was first enacted in order to address 
developing issues in cybercrimes.107  The most recent embodiment 
of the Act has broadened its applicability to offer protection to the 
vast majority of computer users.108  It also addresses the infection 
of these protected computers by viruses and worms.  The federal 
statute 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) requires the person to 
knowingly cause the transmission of a program . . . 
and as a result of such conduct, intentionally cause 
damage without authorization to a protected 
computer, and . . . (B) by conduct described in 
clause (i) . . . of subparagraph (A) cause . . . (i) loss 
to 1 or more persons during any one-year period 
aggregating at least $5,000 in value.109 
The CFAA attempts to cover a very broad range of activities, 
but focuses mostly on the issue of unauthorized access.110  Section 
 
 106 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002). 
 107 The CFAA was amended in 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2002. 
See id. (outlining the legislative history of the CFAA). 
 108 The CFAA defines “protected computer” as “a computer . . .  which is used in 
interstate or foreign commerce or communication, . . . . “ 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). This 
definition effectively covers any computer connected to the Internet or used for business. 
 109 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2002). 
 110 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)  (including “[w]hoever—having knowingly accessed a 
computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(2) (covering  “[w]hoever—intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (covering 
“[w]hoever—intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic 
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(5)(A) of the criminal statute encompasses the purposeful or 
knowing release of a computer virus, but not the reckless or 
negligent release of such a program.111  The statute does not 
address the writing of the virus program, but only its knowing 
release and the damage intentionally caused by it.  This particular 
section of the statute allows a virus writer to create virus code on 
his system and risk its release through negligence.112  In addition, 
by requiring damage to be caused intentionally or knowingly, this 
statute requires the virus program to either be designed with a 
malicious nature recognizable in its code or to be released with the 
intent of causing harm. 
Much less difficult to perceive than a person’s intent is the 
actual unauthorized access of a computer system or network, and 
the compromise of its integrity.113  Both access and a compromise 
of integrity can occur without any damage having been caused to 
the computer system or its files.  Unauthorized access is easy to 
recognize because the evidence of the infection and the loss of 
system integrity is the presence of the virus on the victimized 
system and is not in the details of the virus’s code or in 
understanding the writer’s mental state at the time of its release.  
The virus infection is an objective element of the crime rather than 
a subjective one.  The unauthorized access can be shown by the 
presence of any malicious code on the user’s system.  Even if it 
was never activated due to programming bugs or incompatibility 
with the host system, it is still evidence of someone other than the 
owner affecting changes to the computer.  This unwanted and 
unknown change to the system is exactly what is encompassed by 
the term compromise of integrity. 
 
computer . . . .”); 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (covering “[w]hoever—knowingly and with an 
intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer . . . .”). 
 111 The possible means of disseminating a computer virus was discussed and 
differentiated in Part I.B, supra.  A virus may be released purposely by its creator, or 
negligently through accidentally activating the code on a computer system connected to 
the Internet. 
 112 The level of culpability required in these sections of the statute must be more than 
negligence to constitute a crime. See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 100, at 210 
(stating that negligence “is distinguished from purposeful, knowing, or reckless action in 
that it does not involve a state of awareness”). 
 113 “Integrity” is defined as “soundness.” THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF CURRENT 
ENGLISH (2nd ed. 1996). 
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2. An Example of the Application of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act 
Early virus releases have been dealt with in different ways.  
United States v. Morris114 approached the infection of computers 
through the issue of unauthorized access and damages.  In Morris, 
defendant Robert Morris supposedly intended the program to 
operate only as a flag indicating vulnerable machines on the 
network.  When the project went awry, he was prosecuted for 
violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.115  The malware that 
Morris released was designed with certain “protections” in place to 
prevent multiple infections of the same system.116  Morris made 
some initial calculations regarding the program’s propagation 
through the network.117  The worm contained no payload, so there 
was no obvious intent to cause damage revealed by the code 
itself.118  All of these behaviors indicate a lack of culpable mens 
rea regarding the damages element required by the 2002 version of 
(5)(A)(i).119 
If Morris had been prosecuted under the 2002 version of § 
1030 he would have had a much better defense; however the 
version he was prosecuted under in 1990 only required: 
intentionally access[ing] a Federal interest computer 
without authorization, and by means of one or more 
instances of such conduct alters, damages, or 
destroys information in any such Federal interest 
computer, or prevents authorized use of any such 
computer or information, and thereby (A) causes 
 
 114 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (deciding the first case involving an internet worm). 
 115 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1988). 
 116 Morris, 928 F.2d at 506; see also The Internet Worm Program, supra note 73 
(describing in computer science terms the technical details of the worm’s operation). 
 117 Morris, 928 F.2d at 506. But see Standler, supra note 16 (arguing that claims by 
computer scientists that they did not realize how quickly a virus might spread is a 
spurious argument because the mathematics known to scientists is sufficient to recognize 
this result). 
 118 See Spafford, supra note 73 (stating there was no code within the worm which would 
explicitly cause damage). 
 119 But see Standler, supra note 16 (stating that other comments located in the source 
code indicated Morris’s worm behaved as he intended). 
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loss to one or more others of a value aggregating 
$1,000 or more during any one year period . . .120 
This version of the statute attaches no mens rea requirement to 
the qualifying elements.121  It was argued that the intentional 
mental state modifying the access requirement should be read as 
applying to the damage element as well, but the court did not 
accept the argument.122  Morris may have argued that this made the 
statute unconstitutional, but a decision in the Ninth Circuit 
demonstrates that the court would probably not have found that 
argument persuasive.123  Even though Morris lacked the mens rea 
to cause damage under the current version of § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i), 
he likely would have been liable under (5)(A)(ii) for damage 
caused recklessly.  He would certainly be liable under both 
(5)(A)(iii) for any damage caused through intentional unauthorized 
access124 and (5)(B)(v) for damage affecting a computer used by a 
government entity for national defense or national security.125  The 
difference would have been the applicable level of punishment.  18 
U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(A) defines a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) as a misdemeanor requiring less than one year of 
imprisonment for the particular acts committed by Morris.  Under 
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(B) the violation of § 1030(a)(5)(A)(ii) 
would be a felony subjecting Morris to the possibility of 
imprisonment up to five years. 
 
 120 Morris, 928 F.2d at 506 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)). 
 121 See id. at 509 (stating the court’s rational for not applying a mens rea requirement to 
the damages phrase of the statute was  the legislature’s failure to specify a scienter 
requirement within the wording of that phrase—unlike other phrases where a scienter 
requirement had been specifically included). 
 122 See id. 
 123 Five years after Morris, the Ninth Circuit held that the government did not have to 
prove intentional damage and that the lack of a mens rea requirement for the damage 
element did not render the statute unconstitutional. See United States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 
865, 869 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 124 The question under this section of the statute is whether a negligent release of a virus 
program could constitute intentional unauthorized access based solely upon the design of 
the program code to gain unauthorized access if the actual release was unintended by the 
writer. 
 125 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(v) (2002). 
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3. State Computer Crime Statutes 
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania use vastly different 
approaches to the problem of dealing with computer-oriented 
crime.126  None of the state statutes outlaw writing malicious 
computer software.  The New York statutes address unauthorized 
access with its Computer Trespass and Unauthorized Use of a 
Computer Act.127  Pennsylvania has a statute barring unlawful use 
of a computer, which involves unauthorized access with an intent 
to interrupt normal functioning.128  New Jersey addresses access 
only in regards to additional conduct following the unauthorized 
access including altering or damaging programs, defrauding, or 
obtaining computer materials or personal identifying 
information.129  To deal with crimes specific to computer usage, 
New Jersey implemented its own computer crime statutes.130 
 
 126 These three states were chosen as a manageable sampling of the different approaches 
taken by State legislatures in defining computer crimes. 
 127 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 156.05 (2006) (“A person is guilty of unauthorized use of a 
computer when he or she knowingly uses, causes to be used, or accesses a computer, 
computer service, or computer network without authorization.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 
156.10 (2006) (“A person is guilty of computer trespass when he or she knowingly uses, 
causes to be used, or accesses a computer, computer service, or computer network 
without authorization and: 1. he or she does so with an intent to commit or further the 
commission of any felony; or 2. he or she thereby knowingly gains access to computer 
material.”). 
 128 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7611(a)(1) (2003) (“A person commits the offense of 
unlawful use of a computer if he: (1) accesses or exceeds authorization to access, alters, 
damages or destroys any computer, computer system, computer network, computer 
software, computer program, computer database, World Wide Web site or 
telecommunication device or any part thereof with the intent to interrupt the normal 
functioning of a person or to devise or execute any scheme or artifice to defraud or 
deceive or control property or services by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations or promises.”). 
 129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-25 (2003) (“A person is guilty of computer criminal 
activity if the person purposely or knowingly and without authorization, or in excess of 
authorization: (a) Accesses any data, database, computer storage medium, computer 
program, computer software, computer equipment, computer, computer system or 
computer network; (b) Alters, damages or destroys any data, data base, computer, 
computer storage medium, computer program, computer software, computer system or 
computer network, or denies, disrupts or impairs computer services, including access to 
any part of the Internet, that are available to any other user of the computer services; (c) 
Accesses or attempts to access any data, data base, computer, computer storage medium, 
computer program, computer software, computer equipment, computer system or 
computer network for the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud, or to obtain services, 
KROCZYNSKI_022508_FINAL 2/25/2008  7:20:52 PM 
840 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 18 
Each of these state statutes demonstrates a slightly different 
approach to addressing computer crimes involving malicious 
programs.  New York and New Jersey laws take an approach 
similar to the federal statute by requiring unauthorized access 
before permitting law enforcement to prosecute the wrongdoer.  
Only the Pennsylvania statute directly addresses viruses and 
worms, and goes as far as making their possession illegal.131  This 
is a superior approach because it allows law enforcement to 
intercede before the virus is released and harm is done.132  This 
helps prevent innocent computer users from suffering damage and 
losses, but it still permits the harmful software to be developed. 
An important distinction to make when analyzing what can be 
damaged is the difference between the definition of property in 
state and federal statutes.  New York, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania explicitly define property as anything of value 
whether tangible or intangible.  Pennsylvania specifically identifies 
computer programs and software as property regardless of its 
form.133  New Jersey’s inclusion of intangible computer materials 
as property allows these computer materials to be protected under 
statutes originally designed for physical property only.134  This 
broadening of the property definition allows New Jersey to use 
established criminal statutes to deal with anti-social actions that are 
in need of deterrence.  It is easier to identify the proscribed 
criminal behavior when applying it to a particular form of 
 
property, personal identifying information, or money, from the owner of a computer or 
any third party.”). 
 130 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-23-34 (2004). 
 131 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 156.05, 156.10, 156.20, 156.30, 156.35 (2006). 
 132 A difficult question that needs to be addressed involves what constitutes ownership 
of the program.  Does the code have to be complete or functional for the suspect to be in 
possession of the program?  If the program is not required to be complete or functional, 
the prohibition on possession collapses into a prohibition on the writing of the code. 
 133 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7601 (2003) (“‘Property’ [i]ncludes, but is not limited to, 
financial instruments, computer software and programs in either machine or human 
readable form, and anything of value, tangible or intangible.”). 
 134 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-1(g) (“‘Property’ means anything of value, including real 
estate, tangible and intangible personal property, trade secrets, contract rights, choses in 
action and other interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, 
captured or domestic animals, food and drink, electric, gas, steam or other power, 
financial instruments, information, data, and computer software, in either human readable 
or computer readable form, copies or originals.”). 
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computer usage.  These definitions do not require the software or 
data to be stored on physical media in order to receive 
protection.135 
a) New York’s Approach 
The New York approach treats computers as a unique form of 
property different from physical property.  The state’s cybercrime 
statutes are modified versions of the physical crimes of larceny, 
burglary, and criminal tampering, but with allowances made to 
capture those facets particular to a computer crime.136  The New 
York statutes do not seem to directly address malware.137  Both 
computer trespass and computer tampering might be interpreted 
broadly enough to cover a computer virus infection, but the 
wording of the statute does not specifically cover such an 
occurrence.138  It is difficult to know if the wording could be 
applied broadly enough to encompass virus distribution, and if so 
how the court could rationalize it, because there is little case law 
on this issue. 
b) New Jersey’s Approach 
The New Jersey statutes are similar to the federal CFAA and 
the New York statutes.  They are focused on unauthorized access 
of a computer system for the purpose of causing damage or 
committing a fraud.139 
c) Pennsylvania’s Approach 
In contrast, the Pennsylvania computer crime statute, which 
was passed in 2002, specifically identifies and outlaws the 
distribution or possession with intent to distribute of a computer 
 
 135 United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that, in 
construing the criminal statute strictly, intellectual property was not a good, ware, or 
merchandise as contemplated by the National Stolen Property Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2314). 
 136 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 156.05, 156.10, 156.20, 156.30, 156.35 (2006). 
 137 Unlike the 2002 version of the CFAA or the Pennsylvania statute, the New York 
statutes do not specifically mention computer programs or software as a means of 
perpetrating a crime. See id; 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7616(a). 
 138 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 156.05, 156.10, 156.20, 156.30, 156.35 (2006). 
 139 N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:20–25 (2003) (Computer-related theft). 
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program with the capability to disrupt the normal operation of a 
computer or system.140  This statute more directly addresses the 
issue of writing malicious software.  It takes into consideration 
both the intent of the programmer in designing the software as well 
as the program’s capability since the two possibilities are stated in 
the alternative.141  In this regard, a program which fails to function 
properly but is designed with the proscribed purpose, may still 
result in culpability.  While it does not directly outlaw the act of 
writing virus code, it does prohibit possession if the person has the 
intent to distribute it.142  This approach is different from the one 
implemented by the federal statute, but it may allow better and 
easier enforcement. 
4. Damage Requirements in Computer Crime Statutes and 
Problems Dealing With Intangible Property 
The second element in the federal cyber crime statute is a 
requirement that a certain amount of damage be done to either a 
single computer or a number of computers in the aggregate.143  
This creates a number of problems in determining what constitutes 
damage.  The type of damage done to computer systems almost 
always involves intangible property.144  Previous federal case law 
has defined what constitutes damage to intangibles differently.  
 
 140 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7616(a) (2003) (“A person commits an offense if the 
person intentionally or knowingly sells, gives or otherwise distributes or possesses with 
the intent to sell, give or distribute computer software or a computer program that is 
designed or has the capability to: (1) prevent, impede, control, delay or disrupt the normal 
operation or use of a computer, computer program, computer software, computer system, 
computer network, computer database, World Wide Web site or telecommunication 
device; or (2) degrade, disable, damage or destroy the performance of a computer, 
computer program, computer software, computer system, computer network, computer 
database, World Wide Web site or telecommunication device or any combination 
thereof.”). 
 141 Id. (stating the definition as “a computer program that is designed or has the 
capability to . . .”). 
 142 An important element not addressed by the statute is whether the program must be 
functional or capable of causing damage when released.  If this were the case, possession 
would not be illegal until the programming was complete and debugged. 
 143 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(4), 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (2002). 
 144 In some instances physical characteristics of certain computer components such as 
the hard drive or flash BIOS can be changed or damaged. See SZOR, supra note 11, at 
305–06. 
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Since the CFAA does not prevent prosecution under other laws, a 
conflict can arise between how the court has interpreted damages 
under the CFAA and under these other laws. 
There has been a circuit split in the federal courts since the 
Supreme Court decided United States v. Dowling.145  This decision 
concerned whether intangible materials should be treated as 
property under statutes such as National Stolen Property Act 
(“NSPA”)146 and the Economic Espionage Act (“EEA”).147  The 
district court for the Northern District of Illinois in United States v. 
Riggs148 found no tangibility requirement coming out of the 
Dowling decision, while the Tenth Circuit in United States v. 
Brown149 held that Dowling did distinguish between tangible and 
intangible property.  The Second Circuit followed Riggs in United 
States v. Farraj by treating computer materials as property.150  The 
court held that  “although not tangible in a conventional sense, the 
stolen property was physically stored on a computer hard drive and 
could be viewed and printed out with the push of a button.”151 
The importance of the distinction between tangible and 
intangible lies in defining and measuring the damage caused in 
computer crimes.  There is an inherent difficulty in determining 
what damage is done to something intangible, and how the cost 
should be measured.  If the determination of damage for meeting 
 
 145 473 U.S. 207 (1985) (holding that the violation of copyrights did not also permit 
prosecution under the National Stolen Property Act since no property had been stolen). 
 146 28 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994). See also Todd H. Flaming, The National Stolen Property 
Act and Computer Files: A New Form of Property, A New Form of Theft, U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 255, 259–61 (1993) (describing the different directions the 10th Circuit and 
Northern District of Illinois took in deciding whether something had to be tangible to fall 
under the NSPA). 
 147 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (1996); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal 
Law in Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. 
L. REV. 853, 893 (discussing the treatment by the Supreme Court of trade secrets as 
property based on natural law). 
 148 739 F. Supp. 414, 421–22 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (distinguishing Dowling’s holding 
regarding intangible property as applied to the NSPA). 
 149 925 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing how Dowling’s holding 
requires a physical component to fall under the NSPA). 
 150 United States v. Farraj, 142 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (applying the 
holding in Riggs and distinguishing Brown as a misapplication of the argument in 
Dowling). 
 151 Id. 
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the minimum amount for the CFAA is strictly a technical, 
objective one, it rests almost exclusively on the design of the virus 
and the intent of its creator to alter or destroy other programs or 
data on the infected system.  Failure to identify an actual injury to 
a computer program, stored files or data, or to the actual 
performance of the system should prevent the determination that 
any measurable harm was done.  In the first case, there is no 
measurable harm because only an actual injury is considered.152  
This does not take into account the time and effort to determine 
that no harm was done to a computer system.  In the second case, 
damages are a form of restitution in which the injured party is 
returned to the position he was in before incurring the loss.153 
The CFAA defines “damage” as “any impairment to the 
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or 
information.”154  This definition leaves the term ambiguous in its 
application to the effects caused by the virus code.155  As was 
shown in the previous sections, not all infections result in the 
disabling of a system or program.156 
In the current legal environment, the federal courts could 
utilize the holding in Brown when interpreting the treatment of 
damage to property for the NSPA and the statutory definition of 
damages in the CFAA.  The Federal Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois stated in Riggs: 
The problem with Neidorf’s argument, however, is 
that he does not cite, and this court is unable to find, 
anything in the legislative history of the CFAA 
 
 152 This is similar to the requirement that a plaintiff be able to identify an actual injury 
that was suffered in order to bring a tort action for compensatory damages before 
consequential damages can be sought. 
 153 This approach looks at the damages from an almost contractual point of view where 
the plaintiff incurred costs to obtain the benefit of correcting any impairment and re-
securing the availability of any program or information, but fails to obtain the benefit 
because it had not been previously impaired or damaged. 
 154 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2002). 
 155 There is no indication of what would constitute “impairment” or what aspects of a 
system’s performance are encompassed by the term “integrity.” 
 156 See supra Part I.A.1 (explaining how virus code can be hidden within a program 
without interfering with the functioning of the program or the computer system in which 
it is stored). 
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which suggests that the statute was intended to be 
the exclusive law governing computer-related 
crimes, or that its enactment precludes the 
application of other criminal statutes to computer-
related conduct.157 
However, there is a contradiction in the application of the CFAA 
and the NSPA to intangible property in a computer crime if it is 
treated as incapable of protection under the Stolen Property statute, 
while any changes to the property are included as damages under 
the CFAA. 
IV. IS A NEW APPROACH TO VIRUSES NEEDED? 
A. Does Writing Malware Need to be Criminalized? 
In order to have a particular action or result outlawed, there 
must be strong societal concerns, which outweigh the basic 
interests in personal freedom.158  The writing and propagation of 
malicious software (malware) is anti-social behavior whose harm 
vastly outweighs any benefits.  There are particular actions and 
mental states that demonstrate the writing and release of computer 
virus code is anti-social.  These particular actions and mental states 
should be part of the criminal statutes that are used to prosecute 
this behavior.159 
The current cybercrime laws approach the threat of malicious 
software by prohibiting unauthorized access of protected 
computers and the resulting damage.160  These laws, however, 
permit the virus writers to develop and refine their malicious code 
 
 157 United States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 158 “Liberty has never come from government.  Liberty has always come from the 
subjects of it.  The history of liberty is a history of resistance.  The history of liberty is a 
history of limitations of governmental power, not the increase of it.” Woodrow T. Wilson 
Quotes, Proverbia.net, http://en.proverbia.net/citasautor.asp?autor=17780 (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2008). 
 159 See generally KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 100, at 173–312 (discussing the 
necessary elements of a criminal statute including actus reus and mens rea). 
 160 This approach allows the laws to treat hacking and malicious software in similar 
manners.  However, is allows the threat posed by malicious software to develop to an 
unacceptable level before permitting law enforcement to deal with the problem. 
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free of any consequences.161  Once the working code is distributed, 
third parties may use the functioning code as they wish.  Thus, 
individuals are prosecuted only if the code is released, infects a 
protected computer system,162 causes damage to that computer 
system, and the infection and damage is reported to the 
authorities.163  These requirements make it important that the 
authorities recognize a virus outbreak immediately and begin to 
acquire evidence of the crime as soon as possible.  In the best-case 
scenario, authorities can trace back the route of the virus to find the 
initial source of the code.164  Ideally the authorities might be able 
to trace the virus back to a suspect’s own computer system and 
find evidence of the original code on the suspect’s computer.  To 
accomplish this, the authorities must obtain warrants in each of the 
jurisdictions where the virus code was relayed during its spread.  A 
delay or failure in obtaining these warrants can easily prevent the 
authorities from following the chain all the way back to the source 
of its initial dissemination due to the loss or destruction of 
information.  Indeed, the initial point of the virus’s release may not 
even be directly connected to the virus’s author.165 
The use of damage as an additional qualification for 
prosecution raises the question of what constitutes damage.166  As 
the previous sections have suggested,167 not all virus and worm 
infections result in observable damage to the user’s computer 
system.  Additionally, if damage is caused, it often tends to be 
circumstantial to the propagation of the virus and not designed into 
 
 161 See infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing why it is necessary for companies to create 
viruses). 
 162 Under § 1030 almost every computer system is protected because they are connected 
to the Internet and involved in interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2002). 
 163 Unfortunately, it is too late for the person or business whose computer has become 
infected and suffered damage.  They must now deal with the problem and resulting 
losses. 
 164 This is similar to the methods used in identifying and tracing the spread of a 
contagious disease. 
 165 See supra Part I.B (explaining ways a virus author can release his code into the 
wild). 
 166 See supra Part III.B.4.  “Damage” is defined as, “[i]mpairment of the usefulness or 
value of person or property.” WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 345 
(1996). 
 167 See supra Part I.A.1. (commenting on the effect that the infection has on other 
software and computer systems). 
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the actual virus code.168  When the intent of the virus writer is not 
evident directly from the code, and the harm that results from its 
release is circumstantial, proof of the requisite mens rea can be 
very difficult. 
Finally, different nations have different perspectives regarding 
what type of activity should be allowed or outlawed.169  There are 
also different factions within each country that might oppose 
particular criminal statutes, because of the adverse effect it could 
have on their particular interests or on the interests of their 
constituents. 170 This makes implementing adequate international 
laws difficult if not impossible to achieve.171  However, by 
narrowly tailoring criminal statutes, it is more likely that different 
nations will find a common ground.172  This is necessary to 
improve the gathering of evidence, apprehension, prosecution, and 
extradition of computer criminals.173  The extra-territorial nature of 
computer crimes requires the cooperation of judiciaries and police 
forces across many jurisdictions.174  A hole anywhere along the 
line can allow a perpetrator to go free.175 
 
 168 See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text (noting that viruses and worms can be 
designed to do different types of damage). 
 169 See Goodman & Brenner, supra note 5, at 170. 
 170 See Global Internet Liberty Campaign Member Letter on Council of Europe 
Convention on Cyber-Crime, Version 24.2 (2004), available at http://www.gilc.org/ 
privacy/coe-letter-1200.html (listing grievances with proposed EU legislation and listing 
organizations opposed to its adoption, because of issues with criminalization and liability 
imposed by the new law). 
 171 See Goodman & Brenner, supra note 5, at 170 (stating that the member nations of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) were unable to 
implement uniform laws to deal with computer crimes). 
 172 Id. at 141 (describing some of the issues which arise in defining cybercrimes). 
 173 Id. at 142 (identifying difficulties cybercrimes pose for traditional law enforcement). 
See also Mark Richard, Prepared Statement of Mark M. Richard Counselor for Justice 
Affairs U.S. Mission to the European Union (2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
criminal/cybercrime/mmrArt29DRstmt041405.pdf (discussing US provisions for data 
retentions and the need for comparable laws throughout jurisdictions to enable effective 
enforcement). 
 174 See Goodman & Brenner, supra note 5, at 223. 
 175 See id. at 141 (explaining how the lack of criminal statutes directed at computer 
viruses in the Philippines allowed the author responsible for the “Lovebug” virus to avoid 
both prosecution and extradition). 
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B. How a New Statute Could Address the Problem 
As a possible solution to these difficulties, one alternative is to 
make it criminal for the average computer user to write and 
possess virus code.176  This would provide law enforcement 
personnel with the tools necessary to prosecute and convict 
individuals who engage in behavior, which has been identified as 
undesirable,177 while not casting a net so wide that innocuous or 
beneficial behaviors are encompassed.178  Properly written criminal 
statutes should help focus the attention and resources of the 
authorities on actions and behavior, which are a true threat, while 
avoiding wasted effort on less problematic behavior.179  This 
approach shifts the efforts of law enforcement from tracking down 
culprits after a virus outbreak, to identifying programmers who are 
writing or have written virus code and placed it in the hands of 
other computer users.  A similar approach is used to track down 
 
 176 In this Note, the “average computer user” is anyone not directly engaged in computer 
security, research, or cyber-warfare. 
 177 See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care about Computer Crime, 10 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 476 (1997); see also Alistair Kelman, The Regulation of Virus 
Research and the Prosecution for Unlawful Research?, J. INFO. L. & POL’Y (1997), 
available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1997_3/kelman1 (stating that 
“virus writing is evil and cannot be justified in any circumstances”). 
 178 “Should we not be a Socrates, who . . . sought Truth and Wisdom . . . the question 
that really matters is not how computers can make us wealthy or give us power over 
others, but how they might make us wise.” Meinel, supra note 34 (quoting MARK A. 
LUDWIG, THE GIANT BLACK BOOK OF COMPUTER VIRUSES (Am. Eagle Publ’ns 1995)).  
The issue of writing new viruses by anti-virus software companies to anticipate future 
code released into the wild is also considered. But Cf., Public Letter Concerning the 
Writing of Viruses & How It Does Not Teach About Virus Prevention (2003), 
http://www.avien.org/publicletter.htm (listing the anti-virus computer professionals who 
believe colleges and technical schools should not have virus-writing classes as part of 
their computer science or computer security curriculum). 
 179 The current number of malicious code releases, including all forms of malware, is 
estimated at 6,368 per month. Yury Mashevsky, Malware Evolution: 2005 (2006), 
http://www.viruslist.com/en/analysis?pubid=178949694.  The number of computer 
viruses released on average day in 1999 was approximately 10 to 15 viruses. Vesselin 
Bontchev, Future Trends in Virus Writing (1994), http://www.people.frisk-software.com/ 
~bontchev/papers/trends.htm [hereinafter Future Trends in Virus Writing]. It would be 
impossible for law enforcement agents to track and prosecute every release of virus code 
considering most do not properly function, and the ones that do probably do not generate 
measurable damage. 
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individuals involved in child pornography.180  It would permit 
closing down websites dedicated to disseminating virus code, or at 
least removing the working virus code content from the site.181  
This would prevent novice virus spreaders182 from obtaining 
working code, which should drastically reduce the volume of 
viruses encountered.183  Virus writing kits184 would also fall under 
this prohibition because there is no legitimate purpose for the 
existence of such tools.  Once the volume of viruses is reduced,185 
it becomes easier to identify and focus on the individuals who do 
possess the skills necessary to produce working virus code.186  If 
 
 180 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2006) (“Any person who knowingly possesses 1 or more 
books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any 
visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or so 
shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if (i) the producing of such 
visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and 
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct; shall be punished . . . .”). 
 181 This is specifically directed at virus code, which could be released or executed 
without requiring any further actions by a third party.  Text including virus code is not be 
included due to First Amendment free speech issues.  It is expected that this would 
reduce the number of virus outbreaks, because it raises the necessary level of computer 
sophistication and software ownership above the average computer user.  Fred Cohen has 
shown that there is no clear distinction between text and code because of the ability to 
convert one into the other through compilers and interpreters. See Fred Cohen, 
Prevention of Computer Viruses (1984), http://all.net/books/virus/part3.html. However, 
not everyone has the necessary software loaded on his or her systems to accomplish this 
task. Id. 
 182 One term used to describe the majority of individuals who release viruses is “kode 
kiddies” because they lack the computer skills to actually do their own programming. See 
Meinel, supra note 34. They participate in the destructive behavior by obtaining 
functional viruses from websites or bulletin boards, or through the use of virus writing 
kits. See Bontchev, supra note 179. 
 183 A large portion of viruses encountered by A-V groups are the result of this method of 
virus creation. See Future Trends in Virus Writing, supra note 179 (stating a large 
number of viruses are generated through virus kits). 
 184 Virus writing kits are programs written by proficient virus programmers that allow 
novices to construct new viruses by choosing to combine separate virus components or 
modules.  These types of viruses usually do not operate properly, but sometimes the 
novice gets lucky. 
 185 See MAXIMUM SECURITY: A HACKER’S GUIDE TO PROTECTING YOUR INTERNET SITE 
AND NETWORK 328 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter MAXIMUM SECURITY] (“[K]it viruses have 
tended to contribute to the “glut” problem (the sheer weight in numbers), rather than to 
the “in-the-wild” problem . . . .”). 
 186 Id. (“Some virus writers and their admirers still regard proficiency in assembly 
language as the hallmark of programming excellence.”); cf. id. (“[A]ssembly language is 
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the only notable outcome of allowing the writing of the code is to 
have it released and cause damage, there is no reason to allow it 
written in the first place.  By moving the prohibited action back 
from possession of the code to its writing, law enforcement is 
given a larger window of opportunity to intercede before any harm 
is done. 
Outlawing the writing and possession of working virus code 
also avoids the issues involved with determining damage.  Since 
prosecution can occur before any computer systems are infected, 
there is no need to identify what effects constitute damage and to 
determine how to measure it. 
The gathering of evidence also becomes easier if the focus of 
prosecution shifts to writing and possession, because it localizes 
the search for evidence down to the computer system of the 
suspect and any of his accomplices.  There is no longer a need to 
trace a virus outbreak back to a source.  This eliminates some of 
the difficulty in cross-jurisdictional evidence gathering after the 
virus release.  Search warrants become directed at particular locals 
and individuals, rather than the jurisdiction of each intervening 
transmission or relay site involved in the virus’s spread.  This 
would relieve the need to immediately identify a new virus 
outbreak in order to preserve the evidence trail. 
The difficulty of tracing a virus outbreak back to its source 
would be eliminated but the difficulty of tracing the source of a 
posted virus back to the individual who posted it would remain.  
The virus writer can use similar methods in each case to maintain 
his anonymity.  Multiple relays through numerous disparate 
jurisdictions can be used to hide the culprit’s trail.  While this may 
make identification of the source of the original code much more 
difficult, it still retains some key advantages over the current 
approach of tracing an outbreak.  Law enforcement could be 
authorized to investigate the site containing posted virus code, 
confiscate the computer file containing this virus code, and perhaps 
quarantine or shut down the site, since possession of the code 
 
not necessarily the language of choice among the current generation of virus writers. 
Interpreted macro languages (especially Visual Basic for Applications) are generally 
harder to use than kits, but much easier than assembler.”). 
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would be illegal.187  This avoids the shortcomings of the results 
oriented approach, which requires unauthorized access and harm 
before initiating an investigation by being preemptive of the 
virus’s release. 
C. Aspects of the Release of Virus Code Addressed by the 
Computer Crime Statutes 
One of the major issues in writing criminal statutes to 
prosecute the release of malicious computer code is defining what 
specific act is criminal and therefore prohibited.188  If the actual 
writing of virus code were prohibited, there would be little 
question of intent because the writing of virus code is not 
something accomplished accidentally.189  The mens rea for 
possession of the virus code could be purposely or knowingly.190  
One concern is that there cannot be strict liability for the act of 
releasing malware “into the wild.”191 In other words, there cannot 
be prosecution without intent, however a statute addressing the 
writing or possession of a computer virus or worm could require 
only that the person know he has written or possesses a virus or 
worm as something inherently dangerous.192  Once again the 
 
 187 See generally Games v. U.S. Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (discussing 
the seizure of computer hardware, software and documents which constitute evidence of 
federal crimes). 
 188 MARCUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 43–48 (Foundation Press 
2002) (outlining the required elements of a crime and how they should be used). 
 189 See supra Part I.A.1, 2 (discussing the unique aspects of virus code which must be 
purposely included for the program to function as a virus or worm). 
 190 It may be argued that this would make all persons whose systems become infected 
liable, but that would ignore the requirement that need of possession or release being a 
conscious act by the individual.  Since virus infection would not be the result of the 
owner’s willful act, no liability would attach under the law. See State v. Baker, 571 P.2d 
65 (Kan. App. 2d 1977) (discussing the need for voluntariness to find an actor guilty of a 
strict liability offence)(citations omitted).  In addition, almost every computer user makes 
every effort to remove malicious code from their system as soon as they are aware of it.  
This would represent a good faith effort to prevent the further proliferation of the code 
and demonstrate that any additional infection was involuntary. 
 191 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 (1994) (arguing that the term “strict 
liability” is really a misnomer, and only the requirement of a guilty mind is eliminated; 
the defendant must still be aware that he is dealing with something dangerous to the 
public). 
 192 Pennsylvania code already addresses the possession of computer virus code. See Part 
III.B.2.c.  The Pennsylvania statute applies an intentional or knowing mens rea to the act 
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technical sophistication of virus and worm code could easily be 
used to prove that the person knowingly wrote prohibited code.193  
The scienter requirement that a person knowingly possesses a virus 
or worm would protect those individuals that become infected with 
such a program and unwittingly disseminate it to others.  Proving 
this level of mens rea is a minor hurdle for law enforcement to 
overcome in prosecuting the person who wrote the code or 
intended to release it because the code would be present on the 
perpetrator’s computer system in a single inactive form rather than 
as multiple infected files.194 
Since the person responsible for writing the virus code may not 
be the person who releases it, statutes should also address the 
release of such malicious code.  In determining what level of mens 
rea should be associated with each element of a law criminalizing 
the release of virus programs, one must consider whether releasing 
the virus must be a purposeful or reckless act in order to rise to the 
level of a criminal activity.195  A second question is whether 
keeping virus code on a system should be considered a negligent 
act because of the possible harm it may cause196 or a criminal act 
 
of possession with intent to distribute. See supra note 140.  A new statute prohibiting the 
actual writing of virus code could require that the programmer only know that his actions 
involve an activity that is dangerous to the public. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 607 (stating 
that “as long as the defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a 
character that places him ‘in responsible relation to a public danger,’ he should be alerted 
to the probability of strict regulation, and we have assumed that Congress intended to 
place the burden on the defendant to ascertain at his peril whether [his conduct] comes 
within the inhibition of the statute.”) (citations omitted). 
 193 The two unique features that define virus code, namely its ability to replicate itself 
and its propensity to locate and infect additional computer systems, make it easy to 
recognize as a dangerous form of computer code. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 194 This form could be either an executable file containing only the virus code, or a 
carrier program with the virus code embedded in it.  In either case, the virus or worm 
code would have to be executed to begin spreading.  A virus writer would also likely 
have various versions of source code files of the virus. 
 195 See DUBBER, supra note 188, § 2.02(1) (outlining the minimum requirements of 
culpability). 
 196 Tort law provides for strict liability involving ultra hazardous or abnormally 
dangerous activities. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (stating that 
strict liability is applicable to abnormally dangerous activities); id. § 520 (examining each 
of the six factors to be taken into account when determining whether an activity is 
inherently dangerous). See also Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N.Y. 290 (N.E.2d 1900).  This 
has covered the keeping of wild animals.  It is possible viruses could be classified as 
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because there is no legitimate or beneficial purpose for possessing 
such code.197  These questions are important because, negligent 
behavior is not usually prosecuted as a criminal offense.  These 
actions are not prosecuted as serious crimes because the mental 
state of the perpetrator has not reached the required level of 
culpability.198 
Eliminating the majority of virus code by prohibiting its 
writing and possession is one way to avoid the issues of defining 
and determining damage.  By attacking the problem before damage 
can be done, it makes the discussion an academic exercise rather 
than a practical problem facing investigators and prosecutors.  The 
courts have given the definition of damages as applied in the 
CFAA a broad interpretation, but that appears to only treat the 
symptom and not the problem.199  This broad interpretation just 
highlights the problem that the legislature and courts have in 
understanding what effect viruses and worms have on computer 
systems and the software saved on them.  A deeper understanding 
 
inherently dangerous considering their propensity to escape captivity and spread, thereby 
doing harm—drawing an analogy between the keeping of computer viruses, biological 
viruses and wild animals. 
 197 Possession of certain substances by individuals has been outlawed because of the 
possible harm they can cause.  Having those substances in a person’s possession 
constitutes a criminal offense. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 12305 (2007) (“Every 
person not in the lawful possession of an explosive who knowingly has any explosive in 
his possession is guilty of a felony.”); id. § 12303 (“‘Lawful possession of an explosive,’ 
as used in this chapter, means possessing explosives in accordance with the stated 
purpose and conditions of a valid permit obtained pursuant to the provisions of this part, 
unless such person is specifically excepted from the permit requirements by the 
provisions of this part.”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.02 (McKinney 2006) (“A person is 
guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when: (2) Such person 
possesses any explosive or incendiary bomb, bombshell, firearm silencer, machine-gun or 
any other firearm or weapon simulating a machine-gun and which is adaptable for such 
use; Criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree is a class D felony.”). 
 198 Although there are crimes based on negligence such as negligent homicide and child 
neglect, which are typically treated as felonies, most negligent crimes such as negligent 
driving are only misdemeanors. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 99, at 261–71. 
 199 See United States v. Middleton 231 F.3d 1207, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
the interpretation of loss and damage in determining that the requirement of $5,000 for 
prosecution under the CFAA had been met because the definition is sufficiently broad to 
include items such as the cost of resources to re-secure a computer system as well as any 
other natural and foreseeable expense to restore items which were damaged). 
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of the mechanics of these programs would help eliminate the 
vagueness of this term. 
Legislators and law enforcement personnel must work in 
concert to eliminate cybercrime.  This cooperation can help build 
consensus with other countries in establishing mutual laws for 
dealing with these cross-border crimes.200 
D. The Pros and Cons of This Approach 
1. Innocent Software 
There are legitimate operations occurring on computers, which 
might fall under the term “compromise of integrity.” These 
operations include automatic updates and patches activated by 
programs on the user’s system.201 These programs typically 
function without alerting the user, or only mentioning when an 
update has been completed successfully.202  It may be argued that 
the code functions without the user’s knowledge or this loss of 
control is unwanted.203  Opponents of the prohibition could argue 
that this sort of computer activity could result in criminal charges 
or civil liability against the software manufacturer.  An easy 
counter to this argument is that software users knowingly installed 
the program on their systems and made the required change of 
settings so the program would behave in this manner.204  
Alternatively, it could be implied that users want the updates, such 
as for anti-virus programs and operating systems, even if not 
expressly notified.  In such instances, the access could not be 
termed unauthorized if the system owner installed the program 
knowingly, expecting and desiring these updates.  Cookies and 
 
 200 See Goodman & Brenner, supra note 5, at 141. 
 201 Microsoft has just such an update manager, update.exe. See The User Rights that are 
Required by Update.exe, http://support.microsoft.com/kb/888791 (last visited Dec. 20, 
2007). 
 202 See, e.g., Windows Server TechCenter, How does Automatic Updates work? (Jan. 
21, 2005), http://technet2.microsoft.com/windowsserver/en/library/6d06ca72-d065-45fe-
870b-3b5faf60c21d1033.mspx. 
 203 See Robert Moir, Defining Malware: FAQ (Oct. 1, 2003), 
http://www.microsoft.com/techne t/security/alerts/info/malware.mspx. 
 204 The particular settings that activate automated functions may be set to “on” as a 
default without ever prompting users, or notifying them of the setting. 
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commercial spyware might be considered a system compromise, 
because the user does not know exactly what information is being 
collected by these programs, when it is occurring, how the 
computer sends the information out to a receiving system, or to 
whom the information is sent.205  A means of circumventing 
criminal liability for such spyware is by requiring notification to a 
computer owner that a cookie would be stored on the computer, 
stating what kind of information would be collected by the 
spyware, and requiring authorization to place the cookie or 
spyware on the system. 
2. Legitimate Reasons Not To Prosecute All Makers of 
Malware 
There are legitimate reasons for writing computer viruses even 
if there are questionable ethical issues involved in doing so.206  
Creators of anti-virus software may need to test their product 
against a variety of malicious code to see how it performs its 
task.207  These software developers can use captured virus code to 
do this testing,208 or they can write their own code having the 
particular characteristics for which they wish to test.209  Under 
such circumstances is virus writing criminal behavior?  Virus 
writing can be socially beneficial by creating anti-virus software 
capable of preventing a particular strand of virus from attacking.210  
 
 205 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 38 (discussing spyware). 
 206 See id. at xxiv, 293 (commenting on the ethical issues involved in the use of virus 
generating kits even by professional A-V researchers). 
 207 One method of testing and certifying anti-virus software involves checking to see if 
it detects 100% of the viruses on the “InTheWild” watch list. See Doctor Web, Updating 
the Anti-Virus and Virus Databases, http://support.drweb.com/faq/a2 (last visited Nov. 
18, 2007). 
 208 Often viruses tested for are provided directly to anti-virus software companies by the 
virus writers themselves, or through virus collection/exchange bulletin boards. See 
Vasselin Bontchev, Veni Vidi, Vicis, VIRUS BULL., 10–11 (Oct. 1997), available at 
http://www.people.frisk-software.com/~bontchev/papers/vicis.html. 
 209 See Meinel, supra note 34 (implying a virus researcher tests anti-virus programs 
using code he has written himself). 
 210 Some A-V professionals may feel there is a self perpetuating cycle where virus 
writers attempt to create a new virus that current software cannot detect, which leads A-V 
programmers to create new software to detect the new viruses without the virus having 
been released into the wild.  This could be considered a mixed blessing, since the general 
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This attempt at virus pre-emption could be considered criminal 
behavior if the act of writing a computer virus is criminalized.211  
Some scholars posit that viruses are sufficiently lifelike so that 
their study could reveal details about the basic foundations of life 
itself.212 
Additionally, anti-virus software companies attempt to keep 
both their captured and created viruses isolated from connected 
systems when conducting their tests, but like biological viruses, 
their nature is to spread.  Should an unwanted and unexpected 
release from a development and test system be treated as a criminal 
act because the virus accessed protected systems and caused 
damage?  Once the virus is free, its natural course is to infect 
systems and propagate itself. 
3. Free Speech Issues 
A major consideration that has prevented the prohibition of 
virus writing is whether the First Amendment of the Constitution 
protects computer programs as a writing or expression.213  
Arguments have been made for both sides,214 but the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not yet directly addressed protection for computer virus 
code.215  The courts have, however, addressed the extent of First 
 
population is not initially exposed to the new code before A-V professionals have an 
opportunity to analyze and combat it. 
 211 Some researchers are of the opinion that there are no acceptable uses for viruses, and 
their creation alone should be outlawed. See Alistair Kelman, The Regulation of Virus 
Research and the Prosecution for Unlawful Research?, JOURNAL OF INFO., LAW, AND 
TECH. (JILT), 
Oct. 31, 1997, available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1997_3/kelman1. 
 212 It has been proposed that viruses are a new life form and could reveal details about 
biological evolution in a semi-controlled environment. See DR. MARC A. LUDWIG, 
COMPUTER VIRUSES, ARTIFICIAL LIFE AND EVOLUTION (Am. Eagle Publ’ns 1993) 
[hereinafter COMPUTER VIRUSES, ARTIFICIAL LIFE AND EVOLUTION]. 
 213 Sarah Gordon, Virus Writers: The End of the Innocence, IBM Research Paper 
(2000), available at http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/SciPapers/VB2000SG.htm 
(citing Tippett inviting congress to outlaw virus writing). 
 214 Id. But cf. COMPUTER VIRUSES, ARTIFICIAL LIFE AND EVOLUTION, supra note 212 
(arguing for the value of virus code as a research tool and for philosophical reasons). 
 215 See Robert Plotkin, Fighting Keywords: Translating the First Amendment to Protect 
Software Speech, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 329, 330–31 (2003); Eugene Volokh, 
Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (2005). 
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Amendment protections for other types of computer programs.216  
The arguments made by the court in these other cases can be 
applied to virus code by comparing the technical aspects of this 
code to the programs the courts have examined when determining 
whether computer programs are protected forms of speech.217 
The First Amendment protects the free exchange of ideas.218  
The First Amendment does not protect all speech, but only that 
which convey ideas, information or messages.219  Source code is 
used to communicate complex computer programming concepts 
between professionals and to students and hobbyists.  While almost 
no one examines binary or hexadecimal code for its expressive 
content,220 it can be used to communicate information between 
programmers.221 
 
 216 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445–46 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating 
that both source code and object code is protected speech due to their ability to convey 
information even if comprehensible to only a limited audience, just as a novel written in 
Sanskrit would be protected). 
 217 See, e.g., id. at 449 (discussing the First Amendment protections applicable to 
programs used for decrypting digital video discs and circumventing copyright 
protections). 
 218 See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989). 
 219 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (stating that conduct is only 
protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments if it was intended to convey a 
particular message, and that the message would likely be understood by those that viewed 
it (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)); United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“This Court has held that when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ 
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
 220 In fact, very few programmers even bother to learn assembly language or machine 
code, because the reasons for their preferred use, such as very limited memory resources 
and inefficient or ineffective compiler programs, are no longer problems faced today. See 
MAXIMUM SECURITY, supra note 185, at 328 (“[D]isk space and main memory are no 
longer expensive, and grossly bloated files are less conspicuous in a Windows 
environment. Thus, it’s become more practical (as well as easier) to write . . . in C++ or 
Delphi.”). 
 221 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 448 n.19 (identifying information as the protected form of 
speech most often communicated by computer code); Plotkin, supra note 215; Volokh, 
supra note 215, at 1152 (stating that the California Supreme Court acknowledged 
computer source code is an expressive means used to exchange information between 
computer professionals that understand how it works, but concluded that in the particular 
case involving DVD encryption it was not used to comment on a public issue or engage 
in a public debate, and was only of interest to a select group of enthusiasts). 
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The courts have decided that computer code is speech 
deserving First Amendment protection because of its capacity to 
communicate ideas and information.222  There may also be 
messages encoded into viruses or worms that become 
comprehensible to human beings through the use of a disassembler 
or debugger program.223 
The courts, however, have distinguished the expressive or 
communicative aspects of computer code from its functional 
aspects.224  To appreciate this issue, one must understand the 
general principles involved in getting a computer to perform a 
given task.  Computer software code falls into several different 
categories.  The broadest division is between high level 
programming code (used by applications programmers) and low-
level machine code (executed directly by the hardware).225  There 
is also intermediate level code.226  The higher the level, the more 
inherently intelligible the code is to humans.  The lower the 
programming level, the more adaptive the code is to machine 
interpretation.227  Traditionally, virus coding is done in low or 
intermediate level programming languages.228  Computer code may 
 
 222 Corley, 273 F.3d at 449. 
 223 See SZOR, supra note 11, at 24–25 (describing the author’s first encounter with a 
virus through the use of the DEBUG tool).  This Note does not address the capacity of the 
program to display certain messages on the computer screen, or what could be embedded 
in the computer code, but only what could be comprehended through reading the actual 
machine code. 
 224 Corley, 273 F.3d at 450–51 (noting that computer code has both a communicative 
and a functional aspect, so that both the speech and non-speech elements must be 
considered in determining the scope of First Amendment protection allotted). 
 225 See TANENBAUM, supra note 31, at 3–7 (defining the programming levels and virtual 
machine levels of a computer system). 
 226 Assembly language can be considered intermediate level programming because it has 
features of both high and low level code. Id. See also TOM SWAN, MASTERING TURBO 
ASSEMBLER 4 (2d ed. 1995) (“Assembly language programs are also translated to 
machine code by a program called an assembler.  Despite this similarity with other 
languages, assembly language is neither high nor low level; it’s sort of stuck in 
between.”). 
 227 See MANO, supra note 32, at 174–75 (describing the different programming 
categories and how suitable they are for execution by a computer). 
 228 See MAXIMUM SECURITY, supra note 185, at 327 (“Older viruses were often written 
in assembly language. In fact, it’s difficult to write some types of virus in a high-level 
language, even with the help of an inline assembler. This is an advantage, from the 
viewpoint of virus victims, in that it takes a certain level of programming expertise to 
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also be divided into two other categories.229  The code written by 
programmers is called source code.230  The code used to make a 
computer system perform an operation is called object code or 
machine code.231  Source code is converted into object code 
through the use of a compiler or interpreter.232  A computer cannot 
run a source code file directly.233  A determination whether all of 
these different incarnations of a computer program are protected as 
free speech must be made.234 
The differentiation between the high-level computer languages 
and machine code makes the application of the First Amendment 
both more and less difficult.  The languages’ distinct differences, 
however, make it much easier to recognize where First 
Amendment protections should be applied, and how to tailor the 
laws narrowly to take advantage of those differences.  Source code 
 
create even a weak virus (or even to modify an existing virus so as to create a variant).”).  
These would include Assembly language and Machine language code. See SWAN, supra 
note 226, at 4.  Now most virus code is written through the use of higher-level language 
compilers; the exception might be for virus writers who pride themselves on coding in 
low-level languages. See MAXIMUM SECURITY, supra note 185, at 328.  But see supra 
note 182 and accompanying text. 
 229 See TANENBAUM, supra note 31, at 397. 
 230 Id. 
 231 SWAN, supra note 226, at 4 (“Even though it may appear that a computer 
‘understands’ high-level languages such as BASIC, Pascal, or C, all computer programs 
actually run in machine language, the coded bytes that drive the computer’s central 
processing unit (CPU).  For this reason, machine code is a better term for this lowest of 
low-level computer languages—the only language the CPU knows.”). 
 232 See TANENBAUM, supra note 31, at 2.  A compiler translates the high-level source 
code into low-level machine code in a single operation, thereby generating a new file 
consisting of the low level code. Id.  An interpreter converts the source code into machine 
code one instruction at a time. Id.  As each line is translated, the machine performs the 
specific instruction.  See id. (describing the two methods of translating source code into 
machine instructions). 
 233 SWAN, supra note 226, at 4 (“Because CPUs can’t directly execute C and Pascal 
statements, programs in these and other high level languages must be compiled 
(translated) to machine code before the programs can be used.  Similarly, a program 
written in an interpreted language such as BASIC or LISP must be translated to machine 
code, although in these cases, the translation happens invisibly while the program runs, 
usually one statement at a time.”). 
 234 At this point in time, the law has not clearly differentiated between these different 
types of computer programs. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 
429, 445–46 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that both source code and object code is protected 
speech due to their ability to convey information even if comprehensible to only a limited 
audience, just as a novel written in Sanskrit would be protected). 
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conveys information and ideas between computer programmers 
and may be the best medium for this communication.235  Source 
code is also non-functioning.236  However, unlike the majority of 
crime-facilitating speech, which raises First Amendment issues,237 
a compiled virus program in the form of machine code is 
functioning,238 and is not comprehensible to the vast majority of 
human beings.239  The fact that machine code is functioning means 
it has both speech and non-speech elements.240  The presence of 
the non-speech element would allow the creation of content neutral 
restrictions, since it could be directed at the function of the 
program rather than its content or expression.241  This restriction 
would have to serve a substantial government interest, such as the 
protection of persons online or the safe utilization of the 
Internet.242  Likewise, the restriction cannot burden substantially 
more speech than is required.243 
The machine code’s only true purpose is to cause the computer 
to behave in a particular manner desired by the programmer.  
While it is possible to communicate programming ideas in the 
 
 235 See Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that source code is 
protected by the First Amendment because it is an expressive means for the exchange of 
information and ideas about computer programming). 
 236 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
 237 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1097–1103 
(2005) (listing a wide range of communications which have some potential for facilitating 
crime). 
 238 See supra note 232. 
 239 Almost no one, including professional computer programmers, would be able to read 
a series of ones and zeroes representing the opcodes for a given machine or the data being 
stored or operated upon as it would be displayed through a core dump of a range of RAM 
addresses. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 240 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 451 (2d Cir. 2001) (“the 
realities of what code is and what its normal functions are require a First Amendment 
analysis that treats code as combining nonspeech and speech elements, i.e., functional 
and expressive elements.”); Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 328–29 (stating that computer 
code does more than express a programmer’s concepts, it causes a computer to perform a 
task, and therefore “has a distinctly functional, non-speech aspect”). 
 241 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000) (holding that a regulation is content 
neutral if it does not make reference to the content of the speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (stating that nonverbal expressive activity can be 
prohibited because of the action it entails, but not because of the idea it seeks to express). 
 242 See Corley, 273 F.3d at 454. 
 243 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). 
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virus machine code,244 it is not a reasonable mode of expression.  It 
is a functioning device like a bomb.245  Legislation could address 
the functional aspect by prohibiting people from possessing or 
posting computer programs capable of secreting themselves within 
another program or once in residence on a computer capable of 
locating other computers and copying itself onto such computer 
without the owner’s knowledge or permission.246 
A third aspect of viruses, unlike other crime-facilitating speech, 
is that a virus code does not have both a beneficial and harmful 
use.247  The specific characteristics of a virus cause it to have only 
a harmful use.248  These three aspects should be enough to exempt 
the actual working virus program from constitutional First 
Amendment protection for content neutral restrictions.249 
The prohibition of writing virus source code would be a 
content based restriction and therefore must serve a compelling 
state interest.250  The question is whether the programming falls 
 
 244 Corley, 273 F.3d at 451. 
 245 It is unlikely that one could legitimately argue that the components and wiring 
patterns used in an operational explosive device are being used to communicate ideas 
about electrical engineering protected by free speech.  Yet, the sequence of opcodes in 
machine language are protected as communicating computer science ideas.  In addition, it 
is unlikely that someone would argue that textbooks on electrical engineering are not 
protected even if they might be used to build a bomb, because they convey ideas useful in 
a wider range of areas than just bomb making.  Likewise, source code should be 
protected, because it conveys useful computer science ideas, even if those ideas could be 
used to create virus code. See Zetter, supra note 6 (quoting Peter Tippet, “With a 
computer virus, the words are the bomb.”). 
 246 Corley, 273 F.3d at 454 (discussing how a restriction is content neutral if it is based 
solely on the functional capabilities of the program without reference to its content). 
 247 See Are “Good” Computer Viruses Still a Bad Idea, supra note 93 (stating there are 
no applications that are better accomplished by viruses than by a legitimate and legal 
form of software). 
 248 Computer professionals have not identified a single application where a virus form of 
code is a good alternative to other standard types of computer programs. See id. 
 249 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 328–29 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that in addition to conveying the thoughts of the programmer, 
the code has a distinctly functional non-speech aspect). 
 250 The restriction is directed at a particular subject matter (virus programs) that utilizes 
particular ideas (the capability of the code to replicate itself) and contains specific content 
(particular sets of instructions that allow the program to write a copy of itself into another 
program). See id. at 327 (“ . . . government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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within constitutionally proscribable content.251  Under a First 
Amendment analysis to determine whether the government could 
pass constitutional legislation prohibiting the writing, possession, 
and distribution of virus code, the government would have to 
demonstrate a compelling state interest that is achieved by the least 
restrictive means.252  The damage previously caused and the future 
amount threatened by these virus programs should be sufficient to 
demonstrate a compelling state interest.253  The restriction can be 
extremely narrowly tailored because of the unique functional 
aspects of virus code.  The features that make a program a virus, its 
ability to replicate and append or insert itself into another program 
without the knowledge or authorization of the user can be used to 
precisely define the content specific restrictions. 
One possible way to circumvent the problem of how to allow 
the communication of ideas involving virus source code without 
allowing free access to working viruses is to restrict access to 
functioning code rather than completely prohibiting it.  The writing 
of viruses could become a licensed activity limited to professionals 
and requiring the oversight of the federal government or an 
independent organization.254  In this manner writing virus code 
without proper licensing could be added to the list of computer 
crimes, rather than criminalizing the writing of any virus code.255  
This would result in only the regulation of the specific content 
rather than an outright prohibition, thereby avoiding the censorship 
 
 251 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) ( “. . . areas of speech can, 
consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally 
proscribable content. . .”). 
 252 See Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“[T]he 
government may regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to 
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the 
articulated interest.”). 
 253 See Standler, supra note 16; Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(“The government must show the harms are real, and not merely conjectural, and the 
regulation will alleviate the harm in a real and material way.”). 
 254 Many dangerous activities require specific licenses to legally engage in the activity 
(e.g. driving a motor vehicle, ownership of firearms, practice of medicine or law, storage 
of dangerous or illegal substances for legitimate purposes, use of nuclear energy, etc.). 
 255 Standler, supra note 16 (commenting on the failure of legislators to require licensing 
of computer programmers in a manner similar to other professional such as physicians or 
engineers, or the restriction of certain computer programming in a manner similar to the 
licensing of the production or distribution of pharmaceuticals). 
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of ideas.  The creation and possession of virus writing kits could 
also be outlawed, because there is no legitimate purpose for such 
possession.256 
CONCLUSION 
After analyzing the technical features of malicious software, 
the arguments for and against its uses and effects on society, and 
the legislative approaches taken by state and federal governments 
to curtail the propagation of malicious software, Alistair Kelman 
appears correct in stating there is no good reason to allow for 
viruses.257  This is supported by statements made by Vesselin 
Bontchev that there is no good application for viruses which could 
not be better performed by standard (non-self-replicating) 
software,258 and Dr. Tippett259 that virus writing should be 
outlawed.260 
Some statutes do not directly address the issue of viruses and 
malicious software.261  However, those statutes that do address 
viruses do not go far enough.  While they outlaw the distribution of 
viruses and provide sanctions for damage that results from such 
distribution, they do not address the writing of virus code.  The 
writing of virus code is a very specialized act, and has an inherent 
intent to cause mischief.262  The writing and possession of such 
code should be criminalized with suitable exceptions for specific 
professionals in place.  Virus code should be classified as 
inherently dangerous due to its harmful nature, and the lack of any 
socially beneficial facet should proscribe its place in regular 
 
 256 This is not unlike federal laws prohibiting drug paraphernalia. Federal laws 
prohibiting drug paraphernalia prohibit the instrumentality of a crime even though the 
material would be harmless without the presence of the illegal drug. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 
863(a)(1) (2000) (making it unlawful to sell or offer for sale drug paraphernalia); § 
863(f)(1)(exempting persons authorized by local, state, or federal law from prosecution). 
 257 See Kelman, supra note 177. 
 258 See Are “Good” Computer Viruses Still a Bad Idea, supra note 93. 
 259 Dr. Peter Tippett is the Chief Technology Officer at a company that tests antivirus 
products and sends out reports when new viruses are discovered. See Zetter, supra note 6. 
 260 See id. 
 261 See supra Part II.B.3 and accompanying text. 
 262 See supra Part I.A.  Any intention to secrete a piece of computer code on another 
person’s system should be considered a form of mischief. 
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society.  That is not to say anti-virus professionals, computer 
science professors, and other suitably qualified individuals and 
organizations should be prevented from creating, acquiring, 
accessing, or manipulating such code. But virus code has no place 
in the hands of the average computer user or even the hands of the 
average computer professional. 
Very little freedom or right of expression would be lost if such 
acts were outlawed.  The virus writing community is very small,263 
and novices create most viruses with the help of virus writing 
tools.  These individuals cannot claim that their viruses are a form 
of expression, because they lack even the basic comprehension of 
what they are doing. 
Viruses are not inherently evil; Bontchev points out that 
viruses are technology, and therefore lack any ethical 
predisposition.264  The majority of individuals who do write and 
release viruses are not necessarily bad or evil.265  There are simply 
no benefits, which outweigh the dangers and harm caused by 
viruses or other malicious software in the possession of the general 
population. 
Licensing and oversight by suitable agencies or government 
departments would allow continued progress by anti-virus and 
computer security companies and individuals.  This scheme would 
permit researchers to continue their efforts to protect computer 
users from those individuals and groups who are not dissuaded by 
the ever-evolving computer crime statutes.  It would also leave the 
door open for research into computer security, counter terrorism 
and computer warfare; fields where the average person does not 
tread. 
A change in approach from pursuing those who cause virus 
outbreaks to those who write the viruses would produce a greater 
return on the time, money, and effort invested by law enforcement 
 
 263 The virus-writing population was placed at no more than 4,500 in 1994. Sarah 
Gordon, The Generic Virus Writer (1994) (unpublished article first presented at the 4th 
International Virus Bulletin Conference), available at http://www.research.ibm.com/ 
antivirus/SciPapers/Gordon/GenericVirusWriter.html (discussing the ethical and 
demographic make-up of the virus-writing community). 
 264 See Are “Good” Computer Viruses Still a Bad Idea, supra note 93 
 265 See id. 
KROCZYNSKI_022508_FINAL 2/25/2008  7:20:52 PM 
2008] COMPUTER CRIME LAW 865 
in preventing and prosecuting computer crimes.  Congress has had 
over twenty years to examine the beneficial aspects, if any, of 
writing computer worms and viruses.  Legislators should take a 
serious look at statutorily restricting the writing of such computer 
code.  It is an extremely small segment of the population which 
would be affected and they could find permissible ways of 
expressing their interests through licensed professionals teaching 
ethical courses in computer science curriculums. These restrictions 
could be narrowly tailored and directed at activities, which the 
government has a legitimate and reasonable interest in controlling.  
The benefits to everyday computer users and society as a whole 
must be accorded its due weight in any balancing test, and these 
benefits clearly outweigh the losses to the virus-writing 
community. 
